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Abstract
Using panel data from a Chinese science park, this paper explores the role of owner-
ship, eﬃciency and ﬁnancial resources in determining ﬁrm survival in China’s economic
transition. We ﬁnd that eﬃciency has become crucial for the survival of all high-tech
ﬁrms in the science park, indicating the rising signiﬁcance of market forces in China’s
high-tech industry. However, we also ﬁnd evidence of the lingering impact of the soft
budget constraint. We ﬁnd that 1) ceteris paribus, state-owned ﬁrms are less likely to
exit than non-state ﬁrms and; 2) the measure of ﬁnancial distress has a smaller nega-
tive eﬀect on the survival of state-owned ﬁrms than non-state ﬁrms and the smallest
eﬀect on that of ﬁrms owned by the central government.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G30; L10; P311 Introduction
Aggregate productivity growth in a well-functioning market economy stems mainly from
two sources: the improvement in resource allocation within a ﬁrm and the weeding-out of
ineﬃcient ﬁrms through market competition. As envisioned by Schumpeter (1934), economic
development involves a process of “creative destruction,” in which competition in technology
innovations plays the role of a ﬁlter—selecting the winners and driving out the losers. In
this sense, the extent and pace of ineﬃcient ﬁrms dying out in the evolutionary process of
ﬁrm entry and exit are indicators of a well-functioning and dynamic market economy.
China began its transition from a planned economy to a market economy in the late
1970s. In the traditional, planned regime, industries were monopolized by state-owned enter-
prises, and all decisions regarding ﬁrm entry and exit were made by the government. Since
the late 1970s, China has abolished many of the former restrictions on the entry of non-state
ﬁrms into its industries. As a result of these reforms, product markets have become more
competitive in the sense that there is a faster turnover of ﬁrms in each industry, and the
decision-making process as to the entry and exit of ﬁrms is no longer a monopoly of the
government.
Despite the increasing competitiveness of markets, one might still wonder how far the
Chinese economy, after more than two decades of economic reforms, has moved towards
being a true market economy; an economy that is characterized by ﬁrm dynamics in the
Schumpeterian sense. More speciﬁcally, can market competition perform the function of
driving ineﬃcient ﬁrms out of the market? Given the decisive role of government in deter-
mining the fate of a ﬁrm in the traditional, planned regime, does government ownership also
1aﬀect ﬁrm survival in the new, market regime?
This paper aims at answering these important questions by empirically examining the
determinants of ﬁrm survival in China’s economic transition. In particular, we focus on
the role of eﬃciency and ownership. Our study relies on a unique dataset from a survey of
all ﬁrms in the Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing from 1995 to 2002. Zhongguancun
Science Park has been the most important one in China not only because of its size,1 but also
because, like the rest of the Chinese economy, it has been undergoing a dramatic transition.
While state-owned ﬁrms are still active in the park, in recent years, the new entrants have
increasingly been private ﬁrms or foreign joint-ventures. The results obtained from this
study, we believe, will shed light on the dynamics of China’s high-tech industry and also to
some extent China’s economic transition in general.
Our empirical ﬁndings show that ﬁrm turnover in the park resembles that in industri-
alized countries, i.e., both “ﬁtness” (eﬃciency) and “fatness” (ﬁnancial resources) are im-
portant for ﬁrm survival (Zingales, 1998). On average, those ﬁrms that survive have higher
technical eﬃciency, higher labor productivity, higher return on sales and higher return on
assets than those ﬁrms that exit; at the margin, an increase in these eﬃciency measures
signiﬁcantly increases the chance of ﬁrm survival. We also ﬁnd that leverage signiﬁcantly re-
duces the chance of ﬁrm survival. These ﬁndings suggest that after two decades of economic
reforms, market forces have risen to become the main drivers of ﬁrm turnover in China’s
high-tech industry.
1Zhongguancun Science Park is the largest of its kind in China, containing most of the large domestic
high-tech ﬁrms (e.g. Legend and Beida Founder) and many of the major foreign companies (e.g. Nokia and
Motorola). The Park’s industrial output accounts for one seventh of the total output of all national science
parks combined, and contributes as much as two thirds of Beijing’s total growth in industrial output (Beijing
Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
2While both ﬁtness and fatness are important for ﬁrm survival, our work adds a unique
twist: we examine whether ownership also matters for ﬁrm survival in the high-tech industry
under economic transition. The empirical evidence points to the lingering impact of the soft
budget constraint (SBC), i.e., the protective role of state ownership in ﬁrm survival. We ﬁnd
that ceteris paribus, state-owned ﬁrms are less likely to exit than non-state ﬁrms. A further
analysis reveals that the impact of ﬁnancial distress on ﬁrm survival depends crucially on
the nature of ownership: ﬁnancial distress has a smaller negative impact on state-owned
enterprises than on non-state ones, and the smallest impact is on those ﬁrms that are owned
by the central government. All these results are consistent with the predictions of the
soft-budget constraint theory originated by Kornai (1979) as well as with evidence found
elsewhere (Anderson et al., 2000). In the ﬁnal part of the empirical analysis, we investigate
the varying coeﬃcients of state ownership and eﬃciency over time; the regression results
generally show a trend that eﬃciency has become increasingly important while the role of
state ownership has been declining.
This paper contributes to the literature on economic transition, corporate ﬁnance and
ﬁrm demographics. While most of the transition literature studies enterprise restructures
and privatization,2 our rare dataset allows us to study a unique issue: ﬁrm survival. The
results obtained in this study are largely complementary to the literature studying ﬁrm
restructures. Moreover, our ﬁndings have a close bearing on the empirical literature testing
the soft-budget constraint theory (Gao and Schaﬀer, 1998; Li and Liang 1998; Anderson et
al., 2000; Cull and Xu, 2000; Kornai et al., 2003). We are not only among the ﬁrst to show
2See Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a comprehensive review of the empirical studies of ﬁrm restructures
in transition.
3that the eﬀect of leverage diﬀers across ownership types, we also show that this eﬀect diﬀers
for ﬁrms owned by governments of diﬀerent levels. This study also has a close bearing on the
larger literature on corporate ﬁnance and ﬁrm demographics (see e.g., Zingales (1998), Caves
(1998) and Ahn (2001)). While we follow this literature and examine how ﬁrm size, eﬃciency
and ﬁnance aﬀect ﬁrm survival, we also go on to explore a new area—how ownership itself
and its interaction with other variables aﬀect ﬁrm dynamics during economic transition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ﬁrm dynamics in
the Zhongguancun Science Park. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses.
Section 4 speciﬁes the econometric model. Section 5 describes data and variables. Sections
6 and 7 report empirical ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Zhongguancun Science Park
Impressed by the great success of the Silicon Valley model, the Chinese government, in 1988,
built its own version, the Zhongguancun Science Park (the Park hereafter), the idea being
that it will one day become the Chinese Silicon Valley. The Park is located in Zhongguan-
cun in the northwestern Haidian District, the largest district in Beijing. Zhongguncun is
well known for having the highest concentration of universities and research institutions in
China, including the top three academic institutions in the country–Peking University, Ts-
inghua University and the Chinese Academy of Science. The ﬁrst science park in China,
the Zhongguancun Park has remained the largest one in China since its establishment. In
2002, the Park was home to more than 9,500 ﬁrms, employed 400,000 people, and produced
an industrial output of 187 billion yuan. This output amounted to one seventh of the total
output of all science parks combined in China, and contributed two thirds of the industrial
4growth in Beijing (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2002).3
Firms in the Park have enjoyed several preferential beneﬁts. The most notable is the
tax incentive which was issued in 1988. All eligible ﬁrms pay an income tax of 15 percent,
less than half the normal tax rate of 33 percent. Newly certiﬁed entrants can get their ﬁrst
three years of tax waived, and can get a 50 percent reduction in tax over the subsequent three
years. In 1999, amid the heightened awareness and enthusiasm for the “New Economy,” the
Chinese government introduced additional preferential policies for high-tech ﬁrms. The scope
of tax waivers and deductions was enlarged to include sales taxes on technology transfers,
consulting, services, and R&D expenditure. Another unprecedented policy allows people
employed in the Park to automatically get Beijing residence,4 which attracted strong inﬂows
of brainpower from other parts of China as well as from overseas.
Since the primary purpose of the Park lies in promoting high-tech innovation and
development, entry into the Park is regulated. The high-tech status of entrants is checked
and renewed on an annual basis. A separate government oﬃce, Administrative Committee of
Zhongguancun Science Park (the Committee hereafter) is in charge of reviewing ﬁrm status.
In order to pass the check, ﬁrms in the Park need to ﬁle an annual report, which discloses
information on the ﬁrm’s management, balance sheet, human resources, etc. The dataset
used in this paper is compiled from the annual reports ﬁled by all certiﬁed ﬁrms for the
period of 1995-2002.
The entrants have to satisfy a number of qualiﬁcation criteria. Firstly, the applying ﬁrm
3China has 58 national-level science parks and more than six thousand industrial parks at local levels.
4China has long instituted a strict hu kou (household registration) system to regulate the mobility of
people across localities. A person is not allowed to ﬁnd a job in a locality if she does not have a hu kou
(residence booklet) in that locality.
5must engage in high technology products or R&D activities. High-tech related revenues are
required to account for no less than 50 percent of total revenue. Secondly, R&D expenditure
must amount to no less than three percent of total revenues. Finally, employees with college
degrees must make up at least 20 percent of total employees. When an applying ﬁrm fulﬁlls
these requirements, it will receive a high-tech ﬁrm certiﬁcate issued by the Committee.
3 The Determinants of Firm Survival in Transition:
Hypothesis Development
In this section we review the prior literature on corporate ﬁnance, industrial organization
and economic transition, and develop hypotheses regarding the determinants of ﬁrm survival
and exit. The literature on ﬁrm survival and exit dates back to Schumpeter (1934) who put
forward an inﬂuential argument, that economic development is a dynamic process of “cre-
ative destruction” in which ineﬃcient ﬁrms will be eventually wiped out. This evolutionary
approach stresses the crucial role of eﬃciency for ﬁrm survival in market competition. Thus,
our ﬁrst hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: More eﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to survive in a market economy.
Hypothesis 1 is also a way to test market development. Since economic reforms started
in the late 1970s, China has made consistent progress in developing the product markets.
Price control was virtually eliminated in the early 1990s, and after 1992 private ﬁrms were
allowed to enter many industries. If these developments really lead China to a more competi-
tive market economy, we should expect that eﬃciency plays an important role in determining
ﬁrm survival.
6Eﬃciency is not the only important factor for ﬁrm survival. A ﬁrm may be forced
to claim bankruptcy when it cannot service its debt. As argued in the corporate ﬁnance
literature, the level of debt, usually measured by the leverage ratio, i.e., the net debt-capital
ratio,5 may negatively aﬀect ﬁrm survival because highly indebted ﬁrms are unable to ﬁnance
large investment projects, are unable to compete, and are very likely to liquidate (Myers,
1977; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Zingales (1998) presents strong
evidence that both economic eﬃciency (ﬁtness) and ﬁnancial resources (fatness) matter for
ﬁrm survival. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: More leveraged ﬁrms are more likely to exit.
While both eﬃciency and leverage are important for ﬁrm survival, in this paper, we
focus on a special factor for ﬁrm survival in the context of economic transition: state owner-
ship. Not surprisingly, state ownership provides a very important protective role in assuring
ﬁrm survival. In transition economies, where the markets are imperfect and the market-
supporting institutions are not fully developed, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may enjoy
many advantages in doing business. For example, they may have access to the markets for
certain inputs that are not easily accessible to private ﬁrms. SOEs may even enjoy monopoly
proﬁts if they are in highly regulated industries (i.e., telecommunications). The state may
also use its power to help SOEs in contract enforcement, since China’s legal system does
not function well. Lacking this special protection, private ﬁrms are more likely to become
the victims of breaches of contract, and they may sometimes be forced to exit because of
defaults on the part of their business partners. To summarize, state ownership itself can
5The net debt-capital ratio is deﬁned as (total debt-cash reserves)/total equity.
7mean a better chance of survival in transition countries. This leads to Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: SOEs are more likely to survive than non-state ﬁrms.
Aside from monopoly power and legal privileges, SOEs could, even when in ﬁnancial
distress, have a better chance of survival than non-state ﬁrms. In other words, ﬁnancial
distress may have an interaction eﬀect with ownership. This hypothesis is based on the idea
of soft budget constraint (SBC) which can be traced back to the earliest work by Kornai
(1979).6 According to his theory, a state ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress will be bailed out by
the paternalistic government through various means, such as ﬁscal subsidy or bank loan
extensions. The implication of the SBC theory based on state paternalism is the persistent
survival of state ﬁrms in prolonged distress. Since state-owned ﬁrms have easier access to
government aid, their survival should be less sensitive to leverage. We summarize the above
arguments as our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Financial distress has a smaller impact on the exit of SOEs than it has on the
exit of non-state ﬁrms.
Although economic reforms have made Chinese state banks more proﬁt-oriented and
more independent from government inﬂuence, the legacy of soft-budget constraint has re-
mained in one shape or another (Brandt and Li, 2003). Intervention by government has
steadily declined, but is far from eliminated. Therefore, soft budget constraint may still help
ﬁnancially distressed SOEs to survive even today.
To test Hypothesis 4, we examine whether the interaction of ﬁnancial distress and state
ownership has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm survival. Ideally, we need a direct measure of the
6See also Maskin, et al. (2003) for more recent developments in SBC theory.
8prolonged ﬁnancial distress of a ﬁrm to test the SBC theory. However, a direct measure is
very hard to come by due to the nature of this problem and data limitations.7 In this paper,
we use ﬁrm leverage as a proxy for ﬁnancial distress. Firm leverage is a good proxy because
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms commonly experience an accumulation of unpaid debts, and the
debt level aﬀects the ability of ﬁrms to compete and fund large investments.
Despite the protective role of the SBC, the ﬁrm’s access to ﬁscal or ﬁnancial resources
for rescue might vary across SOEs owned by diﬀerent levels of government. Walder (1995)
and Che and Qian (1998) extend the theory of SBC to explain the rise of township-village
enterprises in China’s economic transition. They both stress the diﬀerentials between the ca-
pacities of central government and local governments to bail out loss-making ﬁrms. The cen-
tral government can presumably mobilize more resources when a massive bailout is needed.
For example, the central government has easy access to bank loans and is capable of setting
tax polices to ﬁnance deﬁcits. This leads to the diﬀerential degrees of SBC syndrome for
ﬁrms owned by diﬀerent levels of government. Anderson et al. (2000) conduct their empirical
analysis based on a similar idea and ﬁnd evidence of diﬀerential expectations of state aid in
times of trouble between central SOEs and local ones. In accordance with these arguments,
we develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Financial distress will exert a smaller impact on the exit of central SOEs than
on local ones.
7See Schaﬀer (1998) for detailed discussion.
94 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Although many studies of ﬁrm survival (or exit) use the probit model, some recent studies
appeal to the duration model which can properly deal with the right-censoring problem
(Meta and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Hojon, 2000). For panel data
in the period (0,T), the right-censoring happens because we do not observe ﬁrm turnovers
beyond year T. The Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model addresses this censoring issue.
The Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model is speciﬁed as follows. Let the hazard rate
of exit at time t be λ(t). We estimate the following Cox proportional hazard rate function
λ(t) = λ0(t)exp[x
0(t)β],
where λ0(t) is a baseline hazard at time t, which is not estimated, x(t) is a vector of time-
varying explanatory variables, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The eﬀect of
the kth variable of x(t) on the relative hazard rate is measured by exp(βk). We will report
the coeﬃcient βk, which equals ∂lnλ/∂xk, analogous to the partial eﬀect of a variable in a
linear regression model. The parameter estimates are obtained by the method of maximum
likelihood estimation. To test our hypotheses, the explanatory variables in x include the
ﬁrm’s ownership type, eﬃciency measures, leverage, size, age, and industry dummies.
5 Data and Variables
The data set used in this paper is from the annual reports of all ﬁrms in the Park for the
period 1995-2002. In these annual reports, ﬁrms are required to report information on ﬁrm
ownership, personnel, R&D activities, and detailed ﬁnancial and cost accounting records. In
total, we have 30,419 ﬁrm-year observations.
10Following Bartelsman et al. (2003), we call it an entry of a ﬁrm in year t if the ﬁrm was
not registered in the park in year t-1 but was registered in the park in year t.8 Accordingly,
we call it an exit of a ﬁrm in year t if the ﬁrm was registered in the park in year t-1 but was
not registered in the park from year t on.
Since ﬁrm exit is the key variable in this study, we need to examine it more carefully.
According to our deﬁnition, a ﬁrm exit can happen in the following situations: (1) The ﬁrm
either was shut down or went bankrupt; (2) The ﬁrm voluntarily moved out of the park or
was merged into another ﬁrm; (3) The ﬁrm did not meet the high-tech standard; and (4)
The ﬁrm failed to ﬁle the annual report. Since ideally we want to examine only exits of the
ﬁrst two types, we need to make sure that the number of exits of the other two types is
small. Although, theoretically, all four types could happen and as a result exit in this case
does not necessarily imply business failure, exits of the last two types are not very likely.
Because the preferential beneﬁts require the ﬁrms to meet the high-tech standard, ﬁrms have
incentives to meet them in order to stay in the Park. Thus, the number of exits in situation
(3) should be small. For the same reason, the ﬁrms in the Park normally ﬁled the report on
time, and did not want to lose the certiﬁcate. A careful examination of the data also shows
that the number of “re-entering” cases due to reporting failures is negligible. To summarize,
although there could be some measurement error for the variable exit, this error must be
very small.9
Figure 1 depicts the general pattern of ﬁrm entry and exit in the Park during the
8Before entering the Park, some ﬁrms may have registered with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce in
Beijing, a government agency that is in charge of the registration of all ﬁrms. So the entry here only refers
to the entry into the Park.
9This measurement error should not cause any systematic bias in the estimation, since there is no reason
to believe the independent variables such as ownership and leverage are correlated with such mis-measured
exits.
11period 1995-2002. In terms of entry, the ﬁrst three years only saw a rather steady and
relatively low inﬂow of new ﬁrms (only around 500 ﬁrms on average). The situation began
to change in 1998. After a small increase in 1998, the new entry ﬁgures began to increase
dramatically in 1999, and hit a record high level of about 2,500 ﬁrms in 2001. There are two
important factors that contributed to this. First, the worldwide optimism in connection with
IT technology and the new economy was at its height in 1999, following the persistent boom
of the new economy in the United States, and this propelled Chinese entrepreneurs (including
some returning overseas Chinese) to rush in and start new ventures in the Park. Second, as
discussed earlier, the Committee also introduced a series of new preferential policies in 1999
to encourage entry and the growth of hi-tech ﬁrms.
Firm exits demonstrate a slightly diﬀerent pattern. The overall rate of ﬁrm exits in the
Park is around 12.5 percent (Table 2). Up to the end of 2000, the number of exiting ﬁrms
was rather stable at the level of 500, and then steadily went up. The rise was mainly due to
the intensiﬁed competition resulting from the sharp increase of new entrants. Overall, the
exits show a smaller ﬂuctuation.
The hazard rate over time also shows an interesting pattern (see Table 1).10 Overall,
the hazard rate in a given year, averaged across all entry cohorts, increased steadily over
time, and it more than doubled in 2002 compared to 1995. Even for a given entry cohort, the
hazard rate also generally increases, although not monotonically, over time. For instance,
the 1995 entry cohort had a hazard rate of 0.032 in the ﬁrst year after entry, but this rose
to 0.125 in the seventh year. The observation that the hazard rate increases with the age
10The hazard rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of exiting ﬁrms in a given year to the total
number of continuing ﬁrms last year.
12of the ﬁrm comes as something of a surprise, since studies of ﬁrms in western countries
generally ﬁnd a reverse relationship between ﬁrm age and the hazard rate. Our multivariate
regressions in the ensuing sections will conﬁrm this interesting relationship.
Since our analysis focuses on the eﬀects of ownership on ﬁrm exits, the major variables
we are concerned with are those indicating a ﬁrm’s ownership type. There are four ownership
types: state-owned ﬁrms, overseas Chinese ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms, and other non-state ﬁrms
(including collective and private ﬁrms).11 State-owned ﬁrms include not only the traditional
state-owned ﬁrms but also those share companies in which the government holds a controlling
number of shares. Overseas Chinese ﬁrms refer to joint ventures in which some funds come
from three special regions of China, i.e., Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. Foreign ﬁrms
refer to the ventures or joint ventures with an injection of foreign funds. Figure 2 depicts
the distribution of ownership types over the time period 1995-2002. Note that in Figure 2
we combine foreign and overseas Chinese ﬁrms into one category which is denoted as “joint
ventures”. The state-owned ﬁrms have accounted for a declining share in the Park over time
while the share of domestic non-state ﬁrms has been on the rise, among which private ﬁrms
become the major driver behind the spike. This shift reﬂects the general, nationwide trend of
privatization of SOEs and the entry of non-state ﬁrms since the mid-1990s. By contrast, the
joint ventures have maintained a relatively stable share in the Park, at around 10 percent.
We use several measures of eﬃciency, which include two productivity proxies, i.e.,
technical eﬃciency and labor productivity, and two ﬁnancial performance measures, i.e., the
11Some privately-operated start-ups in the Park were actually the spin-oﬀs from state research institutions
or universities, and thus probably received state support at least in their early stage of development. From
this perspective, the property rights arrangements of the high-tech ﬁrms in the Park may not be as clear-cut
as expected. However, we are not able to diﬀerentiate these ﬁrms from others due to data limitation.
13return on sales and the return on assets. Technical eﬃciency is a well-received measure for
eﬃciency in economics. The measure of technical eﬃciency is obtained from estimating a
stochastic frontier production function.12 The labor productivity is deﬁned as the ratio of
production and employment. Return on sales is the ratio of proﬁts over sales and return on
assets is the ratio of proﬁts over assets. We also use the export indicator to indirectly measure
the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm. The ability to be export-oriented may also be positively related
to eﬃciency because more eﬃcient ﬁrms have a higher likelihood of entering international
markets, and the more competitive international markets will pressure ﬁrms to increase their
eﬃciency.13
Table 2 summarizes all variables used in the empirical analysis. The ﬁrm is on average
4.51 years old, but the oldest ﬁrm in our sample has operated for 20 years. State-owned ﬁrms
accounted for nearly 21 percent of all ﬁrms in the Park, foreign-owned ﬁrms accounted for
7.6 percent, and overseas Chinese ﬁrms accounted for 4.7 percent. The eﬃciency measures
show a large variation across ﬁrms.14 For example, technical eﬃciency ranges from 0 to 0.820
with a standard deviation of 0.181.
Compared to exiters, surviving ﬁrms are larger, younger, less leveraged, more eﬃcient,
ﬁnancially healthier and more likely to be exporters (Table 3). The diﬀerences in these
12Following Hay and Liu (1997), our stochastic frontier production function is speciﬁed as yit = ai + bt +
αlit+βkit+vit−uit, where yit is log output of ﬁrm i in year t, lit is the labor in log, and kit is the capital in
log. ai and bt are ﬁrm and year dummies, and α and β are estimated coeﬃcients on labor and capital. The
random term vit is the disturbance term that is normally distributed. The term uit is the ineﬃciency term,
which is assumed to be distributed either as truncated normal or half normal, or exponential distributions.
In this paper, we use exp(−uit) to transform it into our technical eﬃciency measure. For more details about
the stochastic frontier production function, please refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
13Some evidence shows that exporting is positively associated with a ﬁrm’s productivity (Bernard and
Jensen, 1999).
14In order to minimize the eﬀects of some outliers, we restrict the net debt-capital ratio, return on assets,
and return on sales between -100 percent and 100 percent.
14aspects are also economically important. For instance, the average technical eﬃciency is
0.246 for survivors but it is 0.214 for non-survivors. The diﬀerence is notable and statistically
signiﬁcant. Other measures of eﬃciency, such as return on assets and return on sales,
demonstrate a similar pattern. Ownership also matters for ﬁrm survival. The SOEs account
for a larger share of survivors than exiters, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the
one percent level. Foreign and overseas Chinese ﬁrms are also more likely to survive. The
results presented in Table 3 suggest that ownership, eﬃciency, and leverage are all important
factors for ﬁrm survival.15 Since these comparison results only rely on univariate tests, they
are descriptive in nature. A more rigorous multivariate regression analysis follows.
6 Ownership, Eﬃciency, Leverage and Firm Survival
In this section, we use the Cox proportional hazard rate model to estimate the eﬀects of
ownership and eﬃciency on ﬁrm exit. We ﬁrst report the results of our basic regressions,
which are under diﬀerent speciﬁcations mainly through alternating eﬃciency measures. To
control the potential diﬀerences in ﬁrm survival in diﬀerent industries, we control for 13
industry dummies in these regressions. We then have two sets of sensitivity tests to check
whether the basic results remain for diﬀerent industries and diﬀerent years.
6.1 Basic Regression Results
Regression results reported in Table 4 support Hypothesis 1 which states that eﬃciency has
become a signiﬁcant factor in determining the turnover of ﬁrms in the Park. All the eﬃciency
proxies yield a consistent result, that is, more eﬃcient ﬁrms are more likely to survive. The
15We also conduct the same univariate test by using data for each year, and have similar results.
15coeﬃcients of technical eﬃciency, return on assets, return on sales and the log of labor
productivity are all negative and signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The indirect eﬃciency
measure, export indicator, also has the expected sign, i.e., exporting ﬁrms being more likely
to survive. We interpret these ﬁndings as evidence supporting the notion that China’s high-
tech industry has been moving towards a market environment in which eﬃciency is playing
a very important role in ﬁrm survival.
The estimated coeﬃcient of ﬁrm age gives us a rather surprising result. Contrary to
the general empirical ﬁnding about the negative correlation between age and exit, we ﬁnd a
positive correlation (Table 4). Given the fact that younger start-ups are less prepared for the
uncertainty in technology and market shocks, one might expect to see a higher failure rate
among them. However, our regression results seem to indicate that age becomes a liability in
the early years of a ﬁrm’s development. The variable ﬁrm age has a positive coeﬃcient and
its square term has a negative coeﬃcient, both of which are signiﬁcant at the one percent
level. The magnitudes of their coeﬃcients suggest that the average age eﬀect is positive.
Take column 1 as an example. The average age eﬀect is 0.484 + 2 ∗ age ∗ (−0.031) = 0.205,
where we set age at its mean. These numbers also imply that age has an inverted U-shaped
eﬀect on exit: age aﬀects exit positively for ﬁrms younger than 7.8 years, but negatively for
ﬁrms older than 7.8 years. Note that one qualiﬁcation we should make is that our regression
model is unable to disentangle the age eﬀect from the cohort eﬀect. Because of this, the age
variable may actually capture both the age and cohort eﬀects. One might as well interpret
our ﬁnding as a result of dominant, positive cohort eﬀect: the survival advantage embodied in
younger start-ups stems from their cohort or vintage advantage in better learning capabilities
16or better aligned property rights arrangements within the ﬁrm. To this extent, what we ﬁnd
about the age eﬀect on exit has something to do with the special nature of the high-tech
industry, such as the swiftness of its technical change.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we ﬁnd that leverage does aﬀect the survival of a ﬁrm
negatively (Table 4). The coeﬃcient on the net debt-capital ratio is positive in all speci-
ﬁcations. This result is consistent with the theoretical arguments as well as the empirical
ﬁnding in Zingales (1998).
Table 4 also shows that ownership matters for ﬁrm survival. After controlling a host of
eﬃciency variables, the coeﬃcient of state ownership is negative and signiﬁcant at the one
percent level, which strongly supports Hypothesis 3. Foreign ﬁrms are shown to be less likely
to exit, but the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in only one case. Interestingly, our results show that,
compared to Chinese inland private ﬁrms, overseas Chinese ﬁrms do not have any intrinsic
advantage assuring their survival.16 Having multi-plants also helps a ﬁrm to survive.
6.2 Sensitivity Tests
There are potentially large diﬀerences in the entry and exit patterns across diﬀerent high-
tech industries. The industry dummies in previous regressions only capture the diﬀerences
between industries by some constants, but they cannot capture whether ownership, eﬃ-
ciency and leverage exert diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrm exit for diﬀerent industries. In order to
capture these potentially diﬀerent eﬀects, we estimate the above model for each of the four
selected industries: (1) electronics and information technology, and products, (2) laser and
16This result is consistent with the anecdotal indications that some of the funds from Hong Kong actually
had domestic origins but were channeled through an outside location in view of the better tax treatment
accorded to joint ventures in Mainland China.
17optoelectronic, (3) mechatronic technology and products, and (4) life science and biological
engineering. These four industries account for 73 percent of total observations in the sample.
Regression results (Table 5) indeed show a substantial disparity in the role of ownership,
eﬃciency, and leverage across industries. While state ownership plays a signiﬁcant protecting
role in the ﬁrst two industries, it does not matter much for the other two industries. In all
the selected industries, technical eﬃciency has a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm survival, but the
magnitude of its eﬀect has a large variation. For example, the estimated coeﬃcient of
technical eﬃciency is -1.642 for the third industry, which is nearly eight times that of the
fourth industry. The eﬀect of leverage also varies greatly across industries. Despite these
diﬀerences, the qualitative results on the role of ownership and eﬃciency remain for these
selected industries.
As discussed earlier, the process of economic transition in China has been accompanied
by the entry of ﬁrms in a large number and intensiﬁed competition in most industries. As a
result, one would expect that the role of state ownership and eﬃciency may change over time.
More speciﬁcally, as the government gradually retreats from directly managing enterprises
and the economy, state ownership would play a weaker role in the protection of SOEs over
time. Meanwhile, eﬃciency is expected to ﬁgure more prominently in the exit decisions of
ﬁrms. Since the Cox Proportional Hazard model does not allow the coeﬃcients to vary across
time, we turn to the probit model to explore this time trend. In addition to those independent
variables included in the Cox models, we also add to the probit model year dummies and a
series of interaction terms of year dummies with state ownership and eﬃciency.
Our regression results reported in Table 6 generally show that eﬃciency has become
18increasingly important in determining ﬁrm exit over time while the role of state ownership
is diminishing. From the reported coeﬃcients of these interaction terms, we can see an
overall increasing trend for the interaction terms with eﬃciency but a decreasing trend for
the interaction terms with state ownership. For example, the magnitude of the estimated
eﬀect of technical eﬃciency jumps from 0.251 in 1996 to 0.908 in 2002. By contrast, that of
state ownership drops from 0.196 in 1996 to 0.137 in 2002.
7 Soft Budget Constraint and Firm Survival
In the previous section, we have found that SOEs are less likely to exit than other ﬁrms.
The advantage of SOEs for survival could be due to the soft budget constraint. We test
whether SBC has an eﬀect on ﬁrm survival, i.e., Hypotheses 4 and 5 in this section.
To further examine the role of state ownership, we divide SOEs into central SOEs and
local SOEs and use two dummy variables for them in regressions. The regression results
reported in column 1 of Table 7 show that central SOEs are less likely to exit than local
ones. As with the advantage of SOEs versus non-state ﬁrms, it is much harder for central
SOEs to fail than local ones. This advantage should at least partially be due to the central
government’s deep pocket, which can be drawn on to back up these ﬁrms.
To test the eﬀect of SBC, we need to examine whether ﬁrm leverage has a diﬀerential
impact on state and non-state ﬁrms as well as state ﬁrms owned by diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment. We include two interaction terms for this purpose: central state ownership interacted
with leverage and local state ownership interacted with leverage. These interaction terms
capture the additional eﬀect of central or local state ownership on the relationship between
ﬁnancial distress and exit.
19Regression results generally support Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerning the impact of SBC
(columns 2-5). Column 2 shows that the coeﬃcients of the two interaction terms are both
negative and the interaction term with central government ownership is signiﬁcant at the one
percent level. A Wald test shows that the coeﬃcients of the two interaction terms are jointly
signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This implies that for a given increase in indebtedness,
both types of SOEs are less likely to exit than non-state ﬁrms, which lends strong support
for Hypothesis 4.
Regressions results also provide evidence consistent with Hypothesis 5. The coeﬃcient
of the interaction term with central ownership is -0.971 while the interaction term with local
ownership is only -0.122. The larger magnitude in the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst interaction term
means that a 1-unit increase in indebtedness will have a much smaller eﬀect on the exiting
central SOEs than the local ones. Note also that the own eﬀects of central and local state
ownership become smaller in magnitude after controlling the interaction terms. The coeﬃ-
cient of the central ownership dummy even becomes smaller than that of the local ownership
dummy. This implies that the large part of the protective role of government ownership
stems from the SBC. Therefore, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of the two government own-
ership types shown in column 1 can virtually be explained by the stronger SBC associated
with central government-owned ﬁrms. Columns 3-5 repeat the regression in column 2 except
for using diﬀerent eﬃciency proxies and yield a very similar result.
An alternative way to test the two hypotheses is to divide our sample into three cat-
egories according to the ﬁrm’s ownership: central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-state ﬁrms,
and run regressions using each of the sub-samples. The results are reported in Table 8. Note
20that the estimated coeﬃcients of the debt-capital ratio diﬀer remarkably across ownership
types in a manner consistent with our two hypotheses. While the debt level has a positive
eﬀect on the exit of non-state ﬁrms, it does not have such an eﬀect on SOEs. Higher debt
level even signiﬁcantly improves the chance of survival for central SOEs.
8 Conclusion
Using panel data from a Chinese science park, this paper explores the role of ownership and
eﬃciency in determining ﬁrm survival in China’s high-tech industry in economic transition.
We ﬁnd that eﬃciency has become crucial for the survival of ﬁrms of all ownership types,
indicating the rising signiﬁcance of market forces over the two decades of economic reforms in
China. However, we also ﬁnd evidence of the lingering impact of the soft budget constraint
on the survival of SOEs.
Since we only have data from one high-tech science park in Beijing, this study has its
own limitations. For example, since our sample only includes ﬁrms from high-tech industries,
we are not able to compare the mechanisms governing ﬁrm entry and exit in high-tech
industries with those in other more traditional industries. Despite such limitations, these
data are among the best available, since a ﬁrm census of this kind is very rare in China. Our
study is among the ﬁrst to examine the determinants of ﬁrm survival in economic transition.
The diversity of ﬁrm ownership in the Park and its transition parallel that in the rest of
the Chinese economy, which helps shed light on understanding the institutional dynamics of
China’s high-tech industries in particular and China’s economic transition in general.
China began its industrial reforms by gradually loosening the state control of ﬁrms,
allowing domestic private ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms to set up, and even privatizing many
21SOEs. The ultimate goal of these reforms is to have all ﬁrms competing in a fair market
environment. Our ﬁndings suggest that these reforms have been very successful at least in
China’s high-tech industry, because eﬃciency is becoming an important determinant of ﬁrm
survival there, as happens in a truly competitive market in the Schumpeterian sense. Our
ﬁnding of the lingering role of the soft budget constraint also suggests that it may still take
some time before the Chinese high-tech industry operates under a true market environment,
but it is moving in that direction.
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Table1: The Hazard Rate for Different Entry Cohorts in 1995-2001 
Year  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 2001  2002 
 
Entry cohorts             
          1995 
0.032  0.078  0.131  0.150  0.140  0.149  0.125 
 
1996    0.06  0.085  0.112  0.108  0.148  0.142 
 
1997     0.022  0.091  0.124  0.127  0.160 
 
1998      0.060  0.074  0.104  0.136 
 
1999        0.044  0.111  0.140 
 
2000          0.092  0.152 
 
2001            0.119 
Overall average 
 
0.060 0.095 0.105  0.115  0.110  0.126  0.144 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics   
Variables N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
          
Exit 
 
30419 0.125  0.330  0  1 
Log(assets) 
(1,000 yuan) 
30419 8.043  1.781  -4.605  17.509 
Firm age 
 
30419 4.506  3.029  0  20 
Net debt-capital ratio 
 
30419 0.443  0.303  -1  1 
State ownership 
 
30419 0.209  0.406  0  1 
Foreign ownership 
 
30419 0.076  0.266  0  1 
Overseas Chinese ownership 
 
30419 0.047  0.211  0  1 
Technical efficiency 
 
30324 0.234  0.181  0  0.820 
Log(labor productivity) 
(1,000 yuan) 
30419 3.600  2.482  -5.617  11.478 
Return on assets 
 
30234 0.0008  0.140  -1  1 
Return on sales 
 
26104 0.005  0.192  -1  1 
Export indicator 
 
30419 0.036  0.185  0  1 
Multi-plant firm indicator 
 
30419 0.074  0.261  0  1 
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Table 3: Comparison of Means between Survivors and Exiters 
   Survivors    Exiters    Difference    P-value   
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 0.000  
                 
Number  of  observations    18,433    11,891         
                 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The t-test on the equality of means for each variable 
is performed on the assumption that the variances are not equal.   29
Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model Estimating the Effects of Ownership and Efficiency 
on Firm Exit 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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(13.07) 
 




























































Number of observations  30324  26104  30375  30419 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -32295  -23104  -32154  -32358 
Note: 13 industry dummies are included in all the regressions but not reported. The t-ratios based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model Estimating the Effects of Ownership and Efficiency 
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Number of observations  14326  5020  1947  728 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -13538  -3483  -1101  -521 
Note: The t-ratios based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 
10% are noted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
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Table 6: Probit Model Estimating the Varying Effects of Efficiency and State Ownership over Time 
  Dependent variable: 1=exit, and 0 otherwise 
Technical efficiency*year 1996  -0.251 
(-1.08) 
Technical efficiency*year 1997  -0.491** 
(-2.55) 
Technical efficiency *year 1998  -0.315* 
(-1.70) 
Technical efficiency *year 1999  -0.247 
(-1.55) 
Technical efficiency *year 2000  -0.449*** 
(-2.89) 
Technical efficiency *year 2001  -0.908*** 
(-6.36) 
Technical efficiency *year 2002  -0.819*** 
(-6.94) 
State ownership *year 1996  -0.196** 
(-2.01) 
State ownership*year 1997  -0.428*** 
(-5.01) 
State ownership*year 1998  -0.641*** 
(-7.53) 
State ownership*year 1999  -0.147** 
(-2.38) 
State ownership*year 2000  -0.049 
(-0.82) 
State ownership*year 2001  0.014 
(0.22) 
State ownership*year 2002  -0.137** 
(-2.16) 
Number of observations  30324 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -10208 
Note: The regression above controls for firm size, age, leverage, export indicator, multi-plant indicator, 
year dummies, and 13 industry dummies but their coefficients not reported. The t-ratios based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model Estimating the Effects of Soft Budget Constraint on 
Firm Exit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Number  of  observations  30324 30324 26104 30375 30419 
Log-likelihood  -32222 -32211 -23025 -32081 -32275 
Note: 13 industry dummies are included in all the regressions but not reported. The t-ratios based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and * 
respectively.   33
Table 8: Cox Proportional Hazard Rate Model Estimating the Determinants of Firm Exit for 
Different Ownership Types 
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Number of observations  4668  3557  22099 
Log-likelihood -1916  -2145  -25926 
Note: 13 industry dummies are included in all the regressions but not reported. The t-ratios based on robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are noted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
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